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Abstract House price modeling has been frequently used to investigate the dynamics of
housing markets, especially competitive markets; yet less attention has been given to
markets that have experienced considerable interventions. The aim of this study is to
demonstrate a mismatch between conventional house price models and the case of the
Netherlands and to provide reasons of such mismatch. We first describe and classify the
conventional house price models into asset-pricing house price model, stock-flow model,
multi-period utility model, and repayment model. These models are subsequently applied
to the Netherlands, where considerable government interventions took place. As expected,
the empirical results are unsatisfactory to explain the Dutch house price development. The
degree of mismatch of the repayment model and the multi-period utility model, however,
seems to be fairly limited.
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1 Introduction
An effective way to investigate the dynamics of house prices is house price modeling, most
of which has been applied to the markets where limited intervention is taken into account
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house price models based on the asset-pricing perspective. Adapting a model that origi-
nated in the financial sector, Campbell and Shiller (1988a, b), for example, developed an
asset-pricing model between house prices and rents, which has been studied extensively
ever since, notably by Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) and Mols and Lindenthal (2011).
Few scholars have modeled price dynamics in a regulated environment due to the
complexity of the influences induced by different interventions; instead, more attention is
given to the impact from certain restricts. One major focus in the literature is the asso-
ciation between tax regime and the cost of owning housing units (see, e.g., Poterba 1984;
Dı´az and Luengo-Prado 2008; Figari et al. 2012). Another is the impact of the spillover
from land regulations and zoning plans on house prices (see, e.g., Peng and Wheaton 1993;
Glaeser et al. 2003; Huang and Tang 2012). The discussion of rent control tends to
emphasize the welfare distribution and market efficiency (see, e.g., Gyourko and Linneman
1989; Glaeser and Luttmer 1997; Micheli and Schmidt 2014).
The literature has showed limited attention to the house price modeling in the markets
with intervention, which is, however, potentially important as using conventional models
may lead to problems. Models for competitive markets are likely to fail to explain prices in
a highly regulatory environment, given that the economic principles set up for free markets
do not fit. This gap can be explained from the impacts of interventions on house prices. If
the classic modeling approach is applied directly to such a market, the corresponding result
is expected to be unsatisfactory because a different price pattern caused by the non-market
interventions. This illuminates the question whether a mismatch exist between house price
modeling and regulated environments; if so, how can the mismatch be interpreted in the
presence of intervention.
To answer this question, we use the case the Dutch housing market which has
experienced considerable interventions to investigate whether such mismatch exists. We
also aim at providing the sources of the mismatch from the perspective of intervention
and interpreting the differences generated from the modeling results. The Dutch
housing market is chosen because it provides a case of various regulatory structures,
such as the strong regulation of rental housing and the favorable tax treatment of the
owner-occupancy. Though the definition of regulation is lacking1, this paper focuses on
interventions comprised of tenure, financial affordability, tax regime, and housing
supply.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we classify the standard approaches
to house price modeling in terms of their theoretical emphasis and underlying assumptions,
which leads to the asset-pricing, stock-flow, multi-period utility, and repayment models.
Subsequently, the general features of interventions are described in Sect. 3. The modeling
results of the Dutch housing market and discussion are presented in Sect. 4. We conclude
with a discussion of the mismatch in Sect. 5.
2 Four conventional approaches to house price modeling
In this section, we classify the conventional house price models into four types: the
asset-pricing model, the stock-flow model, the multi-period utility model, and the
repayment model. These four categories are distinguished because of their economic
1 It is challenging to give a precise definition of regulation for the housing market due to the complexity and
potential interaction of different regulatory aspects.
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principles used in each model type, which does not necessarily mean the four categories
are incompatible2.
2.1 Asset-pricing model
The house price model generated from asset-pricing theory has a similar ground to that of
financial market. Investors are motivated to invest in order to yield returns from both
dividends and capital gains; likewise, when households purchase a housing unit, they
expect to gain benefits from rent flows accrued in the possessing period and capital gains
(Leamer 2002).
The asset-pricing model of house prices provides an intuitive method to connect the cost
of owning housing units to rents through introducing the concept of user cost, which by
definition is comprised of depreciation cost of the housing unit, maintenance fees, mort-
gage interest payment, and the capital gains from the housing asset (Poterba 1984). The




This equation clarifies the arbitrage opportunity between renting and owning a housing
unit. It provides a benchmark for households to decide whether to undertake owner-
occupancy by comparing the cost and benefit. If the rent-to-price ratio exceeds the user-
cost rate, renting becomes less attractive than ownership. When the rents equal the costs of
owning (Eq. (1) holds), a state of equilibrium is reached. This rent-to-price relationship fits
well in markets where the rental regulation is absent or limited.
The economic support of this price-to-rent relationship is grounded in the dividend-
discount model, which was later extended to take account of the time-variate effect on the
dividends (Campbell and Shiller 1988a, b). The extended dynamic dividend-discount
model was further elucidated by imposing the long-run stationary rent-to-price ratio,
leading to the decomposition of rent-to-price ratio at period t as the sum of households’
expected discounted value of rent increase rate, premium, real risk-free interest rate, and a
constant term (Campbell et al. 2009). The decomposition provides an elaborate manner of
reflecting the dynamic dividend-discount model to the relationship in Eq. (1).
The difficulty of estimating the presented relationship lies in the measure of user cost.
Many scholars have applied this method (see, e.g., Buckley and Ermisch 1982; Himmel-
berg et al. 2005; Brunnermeier and Julliard 2008; Gallin 2008; Mols and Lindenthal 2011),
using the similar measure of user cost as proposed by Poterba (1984).
2.2 Stock-flow house price model
Stock-flow model gives special attention to the dynamics of the housing supply sector,
using the demand–supply framework. This means the extra housing units added to the
housing market plays a significant role in adjusting the path of house prices to a new
equilibrium, which is realized from the supply response to the shifts in housing demand.
The concept of the flux of the housing units is highlighted. Both the construction
activities and the demolition speed of the existing housing stock are taken into account to
calculate the net flows of the housing stock based on the theory of durable goods and stock
2 Our aim is not to propose a division that is absolutely incompatible, but rather a division of house price
models that stresses a particular economic aspect. Other ways of distinguishing the models are also possible.
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accumulations proposed by Clower (1954), which was later implemented in the real estate
market by Muth (1957). Many other scholars have ever since studied the adjusted forms of
the flux of housing stocks. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992, 1994, 1996) incorporated the
flux concept into a stock-flow model for the housing market with two sub-markets: the
property market which determines the demand of space, and the asset market that deter-
mines the price of housing units. The ‘flow’ element enters the dynamic setting as follows:
DSt ¼ Ct  rSt ð2Þ
where St is the housing stock at the beginning of period t, DSt is the increase in the stock
during period t, Ct is the extra added housing units, and r is the depletion rate of the
existing housing stock.
Equation 2 connects the property market to the asset market through the construction
activities. Any positive shocks in the demand from the asset market would temporarily lead
to an immediate price increase, subsequently stimulating the construction activities. The
additional housing units, in turn, would alleviate the extra demand generated from the asset
market gradually until a new equilibrium is reached. The equilibrium state can be derived
by setting DSt in Eq. (2) equal to zero, resulting in the connection between the amount of
housing stock and that of construction, which are further linked through rents and house
prices.
2.3 Multi-period utility model
The multi-period utility model is generated from the optimal consumption profile that
emphasizes intertemporal allocation of consumption (Yaari 1964). Households choose the
amount of housing service and other consumption to maximize the utility, given the wealth
constraint. The house price derived from this model specifically emphasizes households’
preferences.
The generated house price model is dependent of the utility function. One appropriate
setting is the Stone–Geary utility form extended from Cobb–Douglas function, which
additionally includes a minimum amount of consuming each good. This form can rea-
sonably represent the utility generated from housing consumption as the inherent necessity
property of housing is taken account by introducing a minimum amount that has to be
satisfied for housing consumption. Olsen (1987) applied such utility presentation to con-
sider a household who accumulates wealth and spends on housing and a composite good to
maximize the multi-utility function in the Stone–Geary form. The optimal solution leads to
explaining the spending on housing in a linear function by the spending on the minimum
amounts of housing service and the composite consumption, and the wealth3.
2.4 Repayment model
The repayment models concentrate on the restrictions imposed by financial intermediaries
as most households rely on applying for a mortgage loan to purchase a house. The max-
imum amount that financial intermediaries are willing to lend depends on their lending
3 Though the choice of utility form would affect the final expression of house prices, given the family of
different utility functions, the Stone–Geary utility form is selected with the intention to illustrate the
mechanism to explain house prices from this economic perspective. We believe the Stone–Geary utility
function is an appropriate representation for the housing preference not only because it has taken the
minimum amount of consumption into account, but also it has relatively simple form. We, however, keep an
open mind for other possibilities.
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criteria, which in practice is evaluated by the capability of repaying the mortgage loan. The
repayment models thus reflect the agreement reached by both parties: banks’ willingness to
lend relates house prices to households’ ‘affordability,’ suggesting a binding effect of
housing finance on housing demand.
To highlight the maximum borrowing capacity, Madsen (2012), for example, used a
maximum lending ratio which was defined as the amount of loan that a household needs to
repay to purchase a housing unit divided by the average income to capture households’
demand, assuming a binding effect of the credit restriction. The result for the aggregate
market gives the house prices in derived-demand form expressed by the maximum lending
ratio, the income, the housing stock, and the adapted mortgage interest rates.
These four types of conventional models are classified because each of them addresses a
particular economic principle. There are a variety of extended studies of the conventional
models. For instance, McQuinn and O’Reilly (2008) and Addison-Smyth et al. (2009) used
the present value of annuity to determine the borrowing limit in the repayment type of
model. In this study, we choose the simple representative to discuss the potential reasons
for the differences in results.
3 The regulatory environment
Regulatory environments can potentially affect the development of house prices and have
been realized in different forms, including restrictions on the supply sector such as zoning
plans, and policies to influence demand, like the tax deduction policy. We discuss four
distinguishing interventions in the regulatory environment4, including tenure choice5,
affordability, tax incentives, and supply restrictions. These regulatory features are selected
because each of them represents one of the roles of households, financial intermediaries,
government, and constructors, though they are likely to have an interacting impact on
influencing the prices.
The tenure choice mainly falls under the rubric of the rental housing system. It
encompasses different ways of subsidizing renting, including direct provision of social
housing units by authorized institutions and imposition of rent controls as permitted by
law. However, rent controls vary in flexibility due to different regimes. Some countries
also offer housing allowances directly to tenants who satisfy certain conditions. For
instance, the Netherlands introduced an allowance for the demand side as an effort to
improve affordability (Elsinga et al. 2007).
Affordability refers to households’ capability to repay the mortgage loan6. Given a
certain wealth, households find themselves confronted with limited options of the funding
channels. The extent to which a mortgage loan can be easily approached or the flexibility
of lending schemes therefore determines households’ affordability, which in turn affects
home-occupancy. The characteristics of regulated markets are not the only determinants of
mortgage schemes. Nonetheless, this regulatory framework should still be taken into
account because of the wide range of mortgage systems. The US may have a more flexible
mortgage system than the European countries, resulting from the inherent difference in
4 Although the definition of regulated markets is lacking in literature, we intend to focus on four aspects in
this study, namely, tenure, affordability, taxation, and supply.
5 Here tenure refers to alternatives to ownership or substitutions for owner–occupancy.
6 Affordability in our discussion only refers to the easiness to finance mortgage, though it has a different
meaning in welfare field.
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rules for originating and assembling mortgage loans under the supervision of federal
agencies (Coles and Hardt 2000). Though all European lenders are subject to the same EU
rules, regional financial intermediaries offer a diverse portfolio of mortgage loans on
different markets (Aalbers 2012).
Another aspect of interventions is taxation. Fiscal policy affects affordability by subtly
raising or lowering the level of household wealth. Thereby, the tax regime acts as an
incentive or disincentive for households to enter the owner-occupied market. A more
obvious impact of fiscal policy is demonstrated by the user-cost rate (Poterba 1992).
Though many countries have implemented tax deductions, the policies vary largely in their
depth and longevity.
The fourth aspect is the intervention of supply side, which strongly affects the con-
struction activities. The long-run house prices would be solely determined by the quantity
of housing supply, given a perfect elasticity. This assumption, however, is not realistic, due
to the prolonged construction activities. The supply elasticity is expected to be further
deteriorated in a country with limited land reserves, not to mention the extra limitation on
land development. It has been suggested that supply elasticity is negatively associated with
the extent to which regulation is imposed on land provision and housing development
(Green et al. 2005). Supply elasticity varies widely within regions, ranging from almost
zero in the Dutch market (Vermeulen and Rouwendal 2007a, b) to around thirty in the
Dallas region in the USA (Green et al. 2005). Regions in face of a scarcity of land and
subject to strict zoning plans—such as in the Netherlands, Japan, Singapore, and Hong
Kong—would have a lower supply elasticity.
4 Results in the Dutch context and discussion
In this section, we examine the performance of the four types of models (asset-pricing,
multi-period utility, stock-flow, and repayment) in the Dutch market. We use a sample
between 1980 and 2008 with semi-annual frequency. The global financial crisis of 2008
provided an opportunity to examine those models in a changed scenario, and an extended
sample period starting from 1980 to 2014 is also applied7. Policies for the Dutch market
changed significantly in the post-crisis period, which involve aspects such as the mortgage
market8, tax deduction polices, and planning deregulation (Priemus and Whitehead 2014).
4.1 Presentations in the Dutch market
We use the simple model form discussed in Sect. 2 to model the house prices in the Dutch
market.9
To implement the asset-pricing model in the Dutch market, the asset-pricing form in
Eq. (2) is considered in logarithmic form:
7 The same presentations are applied in the extended sample, except for the dummies that were introduced
to suggest the post-crisis period.
8 For example, a gradually lowered maximum loan-to-value ratio is targeted at 100 % for 2018 and was set
at 104 % in 2014 by law.
9 We provide the economic principle of each model type instead of the derivation of each empirical
equation in this study. The details of derivation can be found in the corresponding literature mentioned in the
paper.
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logðPtÞ ¼ logðRtÞ  logðUCtÞ; ð3Þ
where Pt is the real price, Rt is the real rent, and UCt is the user cost. This form
10 can
largely represent the principle of asset-pricing in the house price model.
According to the stock-flow model, we use a reduced linear form
logðPtÞ ¼ b0 þ b1 logðHStÞ þ b2 logðUCtÞ þ b3 logðYtÞ þ b4 logðCCtÞ þ b5 logðHHtÞ;
ð4Þ
where Pt is the real price, HSt is the housing stock, UCt represents the user-cost rate, Yt is
the real income, CCt denotes the construction cost, and HHt is the number of households.
This form assumes log-linear relations between rents, incomes, demographic factors, and
housing stocks in the property market, as well as between rent and user costs in the asset
market.
To evaluate the multi-period utility model empirically, we apply several approximations
for the Dutch market. Each homeowner is assumed to occupy an identical single-family
dwelling, following Olsen (1987). This allows us to convert the housing expenditure into
the house price without changing the rest of the equation. The minimum spending on
housing is proxied by the average rents, while minimum spending on other consumption
goods is proxied by a constant fraction of the income level.11 The approximation leads to a
formulation of demand-oriented house prices
Pt ¼ c0 þ c1Yt þ c2Rt; ð5Þ
where Pt is the real house price, Yt is the real income, and Rt is the real rent.
Following Madsen (2012), the repayment model suggests the house prices as
logðPtÞ ¼ a1 logðutÞ þ a2 logðYtÞ þ a3 logðHStÞ þ a4 logðiat Þ; ð6Þ
where Pt is the house price, ut is the maximum borrowing limit, Yt is the income, HSt is
the housing stock12, and iat is the adapted mortgage rates. Equation 6 shows that house
prices derived from reversing the repayment model are associated with the financial
restrictions, housing stock, household income, and the adapted mortgage rates. Financial
institutions usually choose a conventional time-invariant ratio as the maximum borrowing
limit. In the Netherlands, the ratio is around 25 %, meaning that ut is conventionally
regarded as a constant.13
We acknowledge that the specification of Eqs. (3–6) can cause potential problems, such
as the misspecification of the function form as nonlinear function is not considered, and the
issues of omitted variables. These, among others, can be other possible sources of unsat-
isfactory modeling results.
10 Kim (2007) discussed how the rent-to-price ratio is determined when the loan-to-value ratio is binding.
The Netherlands had a portfolio loan-to-value (calculated as the ratio of all the mortgage debt and the value
of dwellings of mortgage borrowers) of 72 % in 2013 (according to the Dutch Banking Association),
suggesting an unbinding loan-to-value constraint, or in other words, the ceiling of loan-to-value is not
reached.
11 We acknowledge that the figures for minimum spending on these two categories are rough
approximations.
12 Housing stock enters Eq. (6) as a result of an aggregation of the average consumption of housing size for
the total households.
13 However, this ratio reflects an aggregate trend derived from financial regulations, monetary policies,
government attitudes, and economic cycle, suggesting a time-dependent ut.
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The main estimation results were derived from an error-correction process as proposed
by Engle and Granger (1987). This method combines the long-term effect, which is sug-
gested by economic principle, and the short-term effect that changes in the course of time.
Equations 7 and 8 present the modeling process:












bjiDxjti þ c  ect1; ð8Þ
Equation 7 is used to generate the long-run effect, depending on the expression for-
mulated with respect to the four models. The discrepancy measured between the actual
value and the long-run value indicates the degree of disequilibrium, which is subsequently
incorporated into the error-correction model in Eq. (8), representing the degree of dise-
quilibrium in the error-correction term (ect1). This method relies on an adjusting process
underlying the long-run attracting factor and also on the short-term deviations.
Accounting for the post-crisis period, a dummy indicator, I(t[ 2008s1), is introduced
in the sample for 1980–2014. A value of one is assigned to the period starting from the
second half of 2008. Only the shift in the constant term is considered due to the restriction
on the sample size.
The data used in this study are from different Dutch organizations. Information on
house prices was provided by the Netherlands’ Association of Real Estate Agents (Ned-
erlandse Vereniging van Makelaars, NVM). Average rents were obtained from the Min-
istry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en
Koninkrijksrelaties, BZK), which were further deflated by the price level in 2006 to get the
real average rents. The number of households and units in the housing stock, construction
costs, and inflation were all generated from data provided by Statistics Netherlands
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS). Household incomes were obtained from the
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, CPB). Infor-
mation on mortgage interest rates came from the National Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank,
DNB).
Considering the tax deduction for mortgage interest payments, an effective mortgage
rate14 is calculated by following Van den Noord (2005) such that
ie ¼ im  0:6ðim  0:0125Þ; ð9Þ
where ie represents the effective mortgage rates after deducting the mortgage interest by
using a top marginal tax rate, im is the mortgage interest rate obtained from CPB. In the
repayment model, the adapted mortgage interest rate iat is used by adding the constant loan-
to-value ratio15 1.16 to the effective mortgage rate.
14 We follow the calculation by Van den Noord (2005) to consider the impact of imputed rent, which is
taxed at 1.25 % of the housing value with a top marginal rate of 60 %. Though the tax regime has
experienced some variation, we stick to this proxy.
15 Due to data limitations, we use the average loan-to-value ratio over the period 2005–2012, which was
generated by dividing the amount of the mortgage by the transaction price, which we drew from the data of
the BZK.
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The user-cost rate is calculated as the sum of the effective mortgage rate, a property tax
of 0.3 %16, the depreciation and maintenance rate of 4 %, and the capital gains on housing
obtained through averaging the price changes over the past 5 years.17
4.2 Results from the conventional models
Table 1 shows the variables used for each model. These fundamentals were applied to
reach equilibria, which were subsequently used to formulate an error-correction presen-
tation. Integration order and cointegration as prerequisites were approved by the aug-
mented Dickey–Fuller tests.18
Table 2 and 3 summarize the error-correction results. The error-correction form of each
model has been achieved for the same criteria by applying the general-to-specific proce-
dure, prior to which the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) was used to select the lags.
All the coefficients present the expected signs, except for those of the housing stock and
the demographic factor. Their unexpected signs may be linked to the explanation of
changes in the number of households. In fact, that number may not constitute the effective
housing demand, as newly formed households usually belong to the younger age cohort,
whose entry into owner-occupancy is restricted. The opposite direction of the influence of
the housing stock may be caused by neglecting the influx of housing in the Dutch market.
The asset-pricing approach seems inappropriate, as no evidence has been found of the
restricted association between rents and user cost indicated in Eq. (3), based on the Wald
test. The generated income-to-price elasticity varies widely, particularly in the repayment
model. An income elasticity of 4.5 is much higher than that in studies by the OECD (2004)
and Kranendonk and Verbruggen (2008), which reported 1.94 and 1.53, respectively. This
uncommonly high-income elasticity indicates the repayment model alone is not sufficient
to characterize the Dutch market. Interestingly, the mortgage rates indicate significant
influence only in the short run, contradicting findings in the literature on the Dutch
market.19
Table 4 summarizes the adjusted R squared (R
2
), the standard error of regression
estimation (SE), and the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The sample including the
post-crisis period shows error-correction modeling results comparable to that of the before
the crisis: a slight decrease of modeling fit appears in the stock-flow model and the multi-
period utility model. The four models presented a relatively high R
2
in the long run, falling
into the range with an upper limit of 0.97 and a lower limit of 0.75. A variation occurs in
the results of four error-correction forms. For instance, during 1980–2008, the R
2
of the
asset-pricing model and the stock-flow model is less than 0.40, compared to that for the
multi-period utility model (0.69) and for the repayment model (0.72). The relatively higher
fit of the repayment modeling result is in part associated with that the Netherlands has an
active mortgage market with a high loan-to-value ratio. This result is also consistent with
the regression error and AIC, reporting the lowest value for the repayment model.
16 The property tax rates vary from 0.1 to 0.9 %, depending on local rates (Van den Noord 2005). We
choose the rate of 0.3 % as an average because most municipalities tend to apply tax rates in a lower range.
17 This measurement follows Poterba (1984).
18 We did not report the tests because it is less a concern for this study, but the results of these tests can be
approached at request.
19 See, for instance, Kranendonk and Verbruggen (2008) and De Vries and Boelhouwer (2009) for more
details.
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The interval of the R
2
becomes slightly larger when the range of the sample is extended
to 2014. This result somehow contradicts our expectation of a remarkably lowered mod-
eling fit in the larger sample period, which should have been caused by the policy changes
and their influences on all the parties in the market. However, the slight discrepancy may
be attributed to the manner in which shifts enter the model. The changes can take various
forms, including elasticity of income. However, this aspect is ignored in the empirical
study, primarily because of the small sample size for the post-crisis period.20 Other evi-
dence can be found in the unexpected sign of the dummy variable in the asset-pricing
model, but also in the relatively stable parameters of these two samples.
The unsatisfactory results validate our hypothesis that the asset-pricing model and
stock-flow model do not fit well in the Dutch market, given the competitive market
assumption embedded in these two types. Though the multi-period utility type has a good
fit, the model itself is problematic as the error-correcting term is not significant at the least
acceptable level. By implication, disequilibrium would accumulate over time without any
adjustment; this model thus cannot explain the price dynamics. The repayment model
appears to be the best of the four, given the strong reliance of the Dutch market on financial
affordability.
The four models illustrate different rates of adjustment, mainly in two categories. The
asset-pricing model and stock-flow model fall into the larger interval. More moderate
adjustments of disequilibrium emerge in the other two models at a comparable level:
around 2 % of the disequilibrium is corrected by the multi-period utility model, around
4 % by the repayment model.
Figures 1 and 2 present house prices in the long and short run according to each type of
model in the sample periods 1980–2008 and 1980–2014. The long-run trend in the stock-
flow model seems to oscillate closely around the actual price movement within a smaller
bound, suggesting better fit in the long term. The long-run relationships of the four models
also provide a different insight into whether house prices are overvalued in a given period
and how the trends pass on to the next period. Similarities emerge among the models,
especially between the asset-pricing and stock-flow type and between the multi-period
utility and the repayment type. The models differ in their over/under-valuation of house
prices. Specifically, the multi-period utility model and the repayment model suggest a
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Note All variables appear in real terms, deflated by the base year 2006
20 Introducing extra change in one parameter would lead to at least two additional coefficients.
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e Long-run result from the stock-flow model
f Long-run result from the repayment model
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Real house-price estimated
Real house-price actual
b Error-correction result from the asset-pricing house-price model
h Error-correction result from the repayment model
Fig. 1 Modeling results through 1980-2008









Asset-pricing 0.94 0.36 0.03 -4.0 0.94 0.36 0.03 -4.1
Stock-flow 0.97 0.37 0.03 -4.1 0.96 0.30 0.03 -3.9
Multi-period utility 0.79 0.69 3078 18.9 0.79 0.55 4052 19.5
Repayment 0.75 0.72 0.02 -4.9 0.78 0.69 0.02 -4.8
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larger variation in the magnitude of the over/under-valued part of house prices. Further
adjustment is therefore more likely to appear when the over-valued house price reaches a
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e Long-run result from the stock-flow model f Error-correction result from the stock-flow model
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b Error-correction result from the asset-pricing house-price model
Fig. 2 Modeling results through 1980-2014
21 IMF (2005) also suggests an overvalued house price in 2007.
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before the crisis hit the market, but they were not as much overvalued as house prices had
been in 2006.
Figure 3 depicts the forecasted house prices based on the main estimation (1980–2008).
As expected, the discrepancy between the forecasted prices and real prices is considerable,
especially for the asset-pricing, multi-period utility, and repayment types. And the fore-
casted confidence interval does not cover most parts of the real price dynamics.
The modeling results provide evidence that the asset-pricing type and stock-flow type
do not fit the Dutch market, while the multi-period utility type and repayment type seem to
perform better. However, there are problems with the latter two models as well. That is
because these models cover the market characteristics only partially, implying that it is
necessary to integrate market characteristics in a regulated environment.
4.3 Further discussion on the conventional models
The unsatisfactory empirical results give us the motivation to search answers from the
conventional models. Though the asset-pricing model has a sounded economic ground and
provides a straightforward intuition, it suffers several disadvantages which could lower the
power of this type of model. The asset-pricing model of house prices assumes a stationary
rent-to-price ratio as time moves toward infinity, which indicates that a smaller house price
appreciation occurs immediately after a sharp increase in house price, vice versa. The
economic reason of this ex ante stationary rent-to-price ratio, however, is lacking and the
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Fig. 3 Forecasting based on the 1980–2008 estimation. All forecasted prices are in logarithmic form,
except for the multi-utility model, as the presentation leads directly to the absolute price level. The dashed
lines suggest the 95 % confidence interval in each sub-panel
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that the asset-pricing model excludes the impact from the credit market and assumes a
perfect credit market.
The stock-flow house price model provides a dynamic view to connect different states
of equilibria, which in turn can also become a demerit. This model presumes a quick
market clearing, meaning that the changes in demand of every period would be absorbed
quickly through the stock in the same period.22 The model therefore excludes the scenario
in which there is demand surplus. This model also has the disadvantage shared by the asset-
pricing model. Efforts have been made to partially modify the stock-flow model.
The multi-period utility model focuses on households’ behavior and provides a rea-
sonable method to incorporate decision-making process. This demand-driven model may
not be able to explain equilibrium in the long run, but can be appropriate for markets such
as the Netherlands where the supply side is strongly regulated. However, the generalization
of the result is difficult to achieve as it depends on the choice of the utility realization.
The repayment model bridges lending rules and households who possess the demand in
ownership, which in turn affects lending stringency. Still, it has some drawbacks. Treating
the lending rules as time-invariant strictly excludes the possibility of the time-variant
structure changes. Consequently, any dramatic change in the macro condition is ruled out.
This model also tends to emphasize the dominant role played by lenders and assumes that
borrowers would take up the maximum amount allowed. Thus, households have less
market power in this model. A repayment model reflects the condition of housing finance.
Thus, this type of model fits markets that rely strongly on banking finance, such as the
Dutch market. In a 2004 study, Boelhouwer and others proposed an affordability model (or
repayment model) for the owner-occupied market in the Netherlands. They suggested that
an interest-to-income ratio, rather than price-to-income, could represent this market ade-
quately.23 This particular repayment model, however, captures mainly the regulatory
characteristic of financial affordability.
Table 5 summarizes the regulatory aspects that the four classic models have addressed.
Each model has partially covered the interventions, instead of all the four aspects; this
provides the possible source of the unsatisfactory performances when the four models are
directly applied to a regulated market.
These four models emphasize different aspects. By focusing on competitive markets,
the models call attention to the potential problems of a regulated environment. The stock-
flow model has taken account of the supply activities. However, by forming the price in the
asset market, and thereby sharing a property of the asset-pricing model, the stock-flow
model is less suitable for a regulated environment. Both the multi-period utility model and
the repayment model highlight some market features from the demand side; they are thus
expected to partially capture the regulatory characteristics.
22 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) have taken into account not only the sluggish adjustment in the housing
stock but also the price adjustment caused by changes in demand—an extra adjustment rate was introduced
resembling the speed of price changes. Although the gradual adjustment in the house price mechanism
seems to contribute only to a limited extent to the equilibrium state, the adjustment does provide a way to
incorporate house prices from the previous period as a component of the short-term effects. This can be seen
from the lags in house prices that are used to represent part of the market anticipations. It is assumed that a
rational individual would utilize all available information to minimize systematic mistakes.
23 Francke et al. (2009) argued that the interest-to-income ratio was nonstationary. This, however, is not
necessarily against the repayment model type.
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4.4 Channels through interventions to house prices
The influence of the interventions—tenure, financial affordability, tax regime, and sup-
ply—on price-formulating process is realized in different ways. The structure of the rental
market determines the accessibility of renting, which is viewed as a substitute for home
ownership, indirectly influencing house prices (King 1980). Renting is sometimes regarded
as the only choice for those who fail to satisfy the financial requirement of becoming an
owner, among other restrictions. For this group of households, the substituting function of
owning is temporarily weakened. The situation is, however, different in markets with a
subsidized rent system through either restricting the rent ceiling and controlling the
increase of rents or directly providing social housing, such as in most European countries,
or by combing both, such as in the Netherlands. Under such conditions, renting as a
substitute for owning seems more beneficial, potentially imposing a downward pressure on
house prices, given sufficient subsidized rental units. This downward pressure on house
prices is, however, alleviated as subsidized renting could possibly increase the households’
saving, helping build up the capital accumulation required to enter the ownership.
The Netherlands has a highly regulated rental market, with over 75 % of the rental
sector in social renting in 2012. Figure 4 shows the changes of house prices and rents for
the past 30 years, and it is obvious that rental market is strongly regulated as the increase
of rents stays within a narrow range. Despite such a high proportion of social renting
dwellings, the position of renting as an alternative to owning has not been strengthened.
One reason is the severely compressed private rental market that results from the con-
siderable provision of social housing and the policy guidance leaning toward owner-
occupancy (Boelhouwer and Van Der Heijden 1992; Haffner 2011). Households now find
themselves in a squeeze: among the tenures—social renting, free-market renting, and
owning—which are supposed to become more accessible than the way it turns out, con-
sidering the long waiting list in the social rental sector, the considerable capital require-
ment to enter home ownership, and the high rents in the free rental sector. The dilemma
becomes most challenging for the young people who have insufficient capital to buy a
dwelling and suffer the difficulty in approaching social housing. Intervention in the rental
sector does not make substitution easier, but rather tends to curb the tenure options (leave
fewer choices) for households and could possibly push up the house prices to a higher level
than these should be in an unregulated market.
Affordability determines whether households who are indifferent between owning and
renting or who prefer owning over renting are capable of becoming homeowners. As
defined here, affordability falls into the realm of financial feasibility, which is determined
mainly by a household’s income level and the lending criteria imposed by the financial
institutions. The variation among mortgage schemes is highlighted as the diversity
Table 5 Regulatory characteristics addressed in the four models
Regulatory characteristics and the four models Tenure Affordability Tax regime Supply activities
Asset-pricing H H
Stock-flow H H H
Multi-period utility H H
Repayment H H
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provides additional flexibility for households, offering options that lower the entry
threshold and thereby ease access to ownership. Presumably, a more flexible mortgage
system would lead to a prosperous housing market (Aalbers 2008).
The tax policy that allows the taxpayer to deduct mortgage interest payments acceler-
ates the booming housing market in the Netherlands, in accompany with financial liber-
alization in the 1990s. The tax regime is carried out because of the government’s housing
targets, such as promoting home ownership, and stimulating extra housing demand. One
way to look at the influence is from user cost in which tax deduction rate appears as a
component. The cost of owning is reduced in the presence of tax deduction because the
effective mortgage interest is reformulated to a more favorable level. As expected,
households are motivated to prone toward the owner-occupied sector, pushing up house
prices (Poterba 1984).
The intervention of the housing supply sector helps accelerate the increase of house
prices. If the time frame is sufficiently long, housing supply ultimately determines the price
level since supply side controls the speed of production so that the quantity of extra added
housing units would be adjusted to absorb the changes in demand. This influence implies
that house price volatility is proportionate to the elasticity of the supply. In a similar
manner, any regulations that jeopardize its elasticity would induce more fluctuations in
house prices (Glaeser et al. 2008). This situation is commonly found in highly regulated
markets, where positive demand shocks are absorbed only to a limited degree. In light of
the observation from the Dutch housing market, a considerable gap exists between the
newly added units in the housing stock and the house prices, suggesting a mismatch of the
stock-flow model.24 As shown in Fig. 5, despite a volatile development of house prices
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Fig. 4 Increases in house prices and rents in the Netherlands
24 Notably the housing stock seems to move in line with demographic change, which suggests a balance
between the housing flow and the ‘demographic demand.’ Yet the latter is not necessarily equivalent to the
real housing demand. The housing demand differs from the demographic change for reasons such as, to
mention a few, the preference change in the tenure choice, which leads to extra demand for owner–
occupancy, and the expectation of higher house prices, which stimulates more potential home buyers to take
action. Another evidence of the gap between newly added housing and the house prices is the supply
elasticity of house prices.
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addition, Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2007a, b) found an almost zero supply elasticity of
house prices in the Netherlands.
5 Conclusion and future work
The aim of the study is to examine whether a mismatch exists between standard house
price models and the markets under interventions and to provide the possible reasons
behind, if any. To that end, house price models were divided into four types: asset-pricing
models, multi-period utility models, stock-flow models, and repayment models. These
types were distinguished on the basis of their theoretical emphasis and underlying
assumptions.
The models were compared empirically in the Dutch market. The results verified the
mismatch between the conventional models and the regulatory environment. However, the
multi-period utility model and repayment model showed a smaller degree of mismatch than
that of the asset-pricing and the stock-flow models. Though insights are generated from the
Dutch market, it is expected to see similar results of mismatch other regulated markets.
The general mismatch reflects the neglects of the aspects of interventions which, in this
study, were decomposed into tenure choice, financial affordability, tax regime, and supply-
side activities. These regulatory elements functioned as the driving force of an anticipated
mismatch between the regulatory environment and conventional models which typically
neglect regulatory features. The regulatory characteristics, however, are not negligible
because of the different influences they have on households’ decision-making process,
which in turn determines the dynamics of house prices. In other words, the tenure which
highlights the option constraints that households confront, the financial affordability which
indicates influences exerted by financial intermediaries, the tax regime which suggests
policy guidance, and the supply activities which reflect the market flexibility, simultane-
ously play a role in a regulated housing market.
To better model house prices in the regulated markets, one needs to take account of the
regulatory characteristics. The supply-associated regulation, for instance, can be captured
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Fig. 5 Gap between the newly added housing stock and real house prices in the Netherlands (index base
year 1988S1 = 100)
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the households’ utility-maximizing problem, which can be represented by the financial
constraint confronted by the households. An integrated framework of modeling regulated
markets is thus required in future work.
Potential improvement could be made by capturing a wider range of regulated features,
notably by elaborating on housing finance, though it is challenging. This study is the first
step toward house price modeling in a regulated environment. Its value lies in demon-
strating a way to relate competitive markets to regulated ones. However, we acknowledge
that different results that are comparable may arise when putting different strategies of
modeling to practice, depending on how each step in the analysis is implemented and how
accurate the measurement is.
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